marginalized because they cannot get access to health care or shelters, because of the criminalization of prostitution, or because of incarceration in which they are subjected to legally mandated violence.
Namaste recommends that feminists and others integrate transsexual politics and theory into their work, not to speak about gender and transsexuality but to make broader links among the structures that regulate marginalized people. This recommendation is typical of Namaste's "either/or," instead of "both/and," approach. Namaste recounts some transsexual-specific ways in which transsexuals are shut out of the social world; for example, without vaginoplasty, a maleto-female transsexual cannot change sex on legal documents in Québec. As she remarks, this makes it very difficult not only to gain employment or access to health care but also to negotiate mundane tasks like picking up a registered letter from the post office. To remove this particular institutional barrier, activists must speak about transsexuality and might do so without making broader links. A recent court ruling established that a male-to-female transgendered person in Québec may add a female name to her birth certificate just in case she demonstrates that she has lived as a woman for five years. But this is not so easy, as Namaste notes, for those who do not work in the legal economy or go to school. Namaste's insistence that we attend to the lives of the most marginalized of transsexuals, as they are structured by interlocking systems of oppression, is crucial, because activism aimed at achieving the kind of change recently made by the court bolsters the erasure of many transsexuals from social institutions and the everyday social world.
Discussions of different aspects of transsexuality and the various controversies that have arisen around transsexuality provide opportunities for raising different non-identitarian questions. A case in point is that of Kimberly Nixon, a male-to-female transsexual who was ousted from volunteer counselor training at Vancouver Rape Relief (VRR). This case has received considerable attention in English-Canadian women's studies classrooms, Canadian feminist scholarship, and Canadian popular media. In defense of its action, VRR has argued that because Nixon does not have the experience of living as a woman since birth, she is not in a position to counsel women who are victims of rape. In their collaboratively written "Inclusive Pedagogy in the Women's Studies Classroom: Teaching the Kimberly Nixon Case," Namaste and Georgia Sitara describe how VRR's defense of its exclusion of Nixon can be used fruitfully to introduce or revisit different paradigms in feminist thought with regard to the notion of experience, its relation to knowledge, and the relations between theory and practice, knowledge and action. Such exploration can help students understand that doing theory is always deeply political.
VRR has supported its "lifelong experience of living as woman" criterion on the grounds that it is necessary for trust between counselors and clients. Namaste and Sitara point out that no, or no other, differences between women are relevant to VRR's selection process, since VRR concerns itself with women qua victims of male violence. Thus, VRR prioritizes sex above, and perhaps to the exclusion of, race, class, and sexual orientation. This gives instructors an opportunity to examine feminist challenges to universalism.
VRR has also argued that the state must protect the human rights, in this case the right to freedom of association, of (non-transsexual) women in order to protect and nurture the potential of the women's liberation movement. Namaste and Sitara suggest that this aspect of VRR's defense opens pedagogical space to examine historically the function and consequences of appeals to protection from the state. Partly by citing Canada's obscenity legislation, which was first used against culture created by and for lesbians, they argue that such appeals can function in deeply conservative ways. Furthermore, they contend that early Canadian efforts to advance women's legal equality have had detrimental consequences for broader human rights. Namaste and Sitara base this claim on a brief portrayal of the racist and imperialist projects advanced by Emily Murphy, often hailed as one of the feminist leaders instrumental in gaining the right to vote for Canadian women.
Namaste tends at times to draw unwarrantedly broad conclusions, for example in "Against Transgender Rights," which she ends with the undoubtedly intentionally provocative sentence: "I invite others to join me in taking a firm stand against transgender rights." In one of two case studies Namaste draws on in the essay, she discusses how in 2001 the city and county of San Francisco began providing health insurance for its employees' transsexual-specific health-care needs. Namaste agrees with San Francisco activists' enthusiasm about this, as it recognizes the specific health-care needs of transsexual people. She argues, however, that to support this program in the way San Francisco activist Jamison Green did is to "call for rallying behind the interests of American big business, both within and outside the United States" (113) The argument of Green's to which Namaste objects boils down to this: San Francisco's coverage of its transsexual employees will, in the long run, benefit those who do not work for San Francisco, because it will provide "a large inclusive insured pool that we can monitor" (107) to rebut arguments that such coverage is too costly. Namaste rightly points out that this will not apply in nations with health-care systems very different from that in the United States. She asserts that Green takes for granted that the provision of health insurance is a right accorded to those who work legally for wages, therefore not to those who do not work in the legal economy. She also claims that Green assumes that providing health care is the function of insurance companies, not the responsibility of governments. Building on these points, she argues further that close ties between political lobbyists and the medical insurance industry in the United States prevent needed change in a system of universal coverage provided by U.S. government entities, and that globalization threatens to spread the U.S. model to other countries, including Canada, which makes Green complicit with U.S. insurance providers' imperialism.
Namaste's moves are unwarranted at several crucial junctures. First, the premise that insurance is a right accorded to employees through their employers does not justify the conclusion that those who do not work in the legal economy have no right to insurance from other kinds of entities, such as federal, state, or local governments. Second, what Green takes for granted is that provision of health care to some, but not necessarily all, California residents is currently the function of insurance companies. He is not committed to the view that the state has no responsibility to assume this function, and his prediction about the usefulness of San Francisco's data might prove correct as California considers adopting universal health care. Finally, even if Namaste were entirely right in her analysis of this case study, nothing follows about the legitimacy of attempts to gain other types of transgender rights.
Namaste is at times antagonistic toward transsexual and transgender activists and theorists who work within gay, lesbian, or queer frameworks. Writing about the ways in which Leslie Feinberg, Kate Bornstein, and Riki Anne Wilchins have been valorized in gay, lesbian, and queer communities, she notes that "these three writers have come to stand in for the entire transsexual community." She correctly objects that this renders invisible transsexuals who identify as heterosexual and those who desire no association with gay, lesbian, or queer communities. However, Namaste quotes approvingly an analogy drawn by Margaret O'Hartigan between "a handful of collaborators" proclaimed as black leaders by a white public-relations firm and white-owned media, and Feinberg, Bornstein, and Wilchins. That many heterosexual transsexuals want nothing to do with gay, lesbian, or queer communities justifies negative judgments neither about those who do nor about the wisdom of such alliances. Just as transphobia might be at the root of some gay, lesbian, and queer refusals to ally with transsexual and transgender communities, some transsexual rejections of such alliances might be based in homophobia. Transsexuals are not exempt from moral responsibility to grapple conscientiously with bias. Still, Namaste is right to point out that gay, lesbian, and queer communities have greater cultural and institutional clout than transsexual communities do, and that their deployments of it often are techniques of erasure.
Despite its flaws, Namaste's work is extremely important. She excels at focusing readers' attention on the most marginalized of transsexuals, at analyzing the ways in which different systems of oppression work together, and at demonstrating that adequate political and theoretical work must take these factors into account. Because of its brevity, accessibility, and passion, Sex Change, Social Change is an outstanding choice for feminists, students, social theorists, and community workers not already deeply enmeshed in transsexual and transgender conversations; for those of us who already are, it is essential reading.
